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ABSTRACT  
In the past nine years, the Greek administration has undergone a wide range of reforms. Did 
the high ambitions translate into significant change? In order to provide some answers, the 
paper examines and compares the outcome of administrative reforms that took place in the 
past years in two core state areas relating to the use of state resources and presenting 
similar problems: (i) budgeting and fiscal management and (ii) human resources 
management. Reforms in these areas are assessed in relation to targeted administrative 
deficiencies. The main research finding is that change has been uneven affecting at different 
degrees the policy core. The ambitious agenda primarily resulted in the modernisation of 
policy instruments. New policy frames competed with old ones, sometimes prevailing and 
sometimes being captured and hollowed out. In fiscal management there is significant 
change, challenging deeper policy frames and patterns accounting for critical deficiencies. In 
contrast, in HRM reforms results are rather unambitious. Thus the changes introduced are 
mostly secondary and do not challenge the core of pre-existing policy arrangements. The 
paper offers an explanation of these uneven outcomes and questions the conditions of 
reform sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
The sovereign debt crisis exposed the deficiencies of the Greek public sector and was seen 
as a window of opportunity for radical transformation. An ambitious reform agenda became 
part of the structural reforms of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). Its 
implementation was integrated in the programme conditionality, closely monitored and tied 
to the disbursement of loan installments crucial to keep the country from defaulting. The 
necessary know-how was provided by technical assistance organised by the IMF, the 
Commission and the EU ‘Task Force for Greece’. In that sense, the essential ingredients to 
proceed existed: first, a powerful incentive mechanism to mobilise the political leadership 
and overcome reform resistances, and, second, the availability of expertise, to contribute 
with ‘good practices’ from other EU countries (Spanou 2018a). 
In the past nine years, the Greek administration has undergone a wide range of reforms
2
. 
Did the high ambitions translate into significant change? In order to proceed to such an 
assessment, this paper examines and compares the outcome of administrative reforms 
(ARs) in two critical areas: (i) budgeting and fiscal management, and (ii) human resources 
management. They both refer to core aspects of state operation in Greece. They are equally 
affected by institutional deficiencies as well as by practices and mentalities inherent in the 
clientelistic-corporatist background of Greek politics. The comparison between them helps 
further highlight different factors potentially explaining the variation of outcomes. 
Such an inquiry involves an assessment of the content of administrative reforms (ARs) in 
relation to targeted critical administrative deficiencies. The main research finding is that 
change has taken place, but is uneven. The ambitious agenda primarily resulted in the 
modernisation of policy instruments. New policy frames competed with old ones, 
sometimes prevailing and sometimes being captured and hollowed out. After briefly 
clarifying the concepts of reform and change, the paper examines the rationale of ARs 
promoted and implemented and assesses their significance in an attempt of explaining the 
uneven results. 
 
 
2. Administrative reform and change 
Reforms are here understood as marking “significant departures from the status quo” 
(Peters 1996:9). Assessing AR needs therefore to take into account its “depth” or 
significance, meaning the extent to which it addresses deeper issues and challenges the 
existing implicit arrangements or system in a substantial way. 
Given that views of problems may not be shared by participants in the reform process 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011:17), attention needs to turn to the construction of policy 
problems which predefines their solutions. Such constructions may also determine “areas of 
immunity from concern” i.e. problematic situations that are not considered as problems 
(Edelman, 1988: 12). In the same vein, the concept of policy frame (Rein and Schön, 1993: 
146) points to the underlying assumptions which serve to select, organise, interpret and 
make sense of a complex reality and therefore define and legitimate action and remedies. In 
this context, policy change may require a ‘reframing’ process or a ‘frame shift’. 
                                                     
2
 The paper relies on the findings of an empirical research Reforms in Public Administration under the crisis, 
conducted with the support of the “A.G. Leventis Foundation Research Chair” of the Hellenic Foundation for 
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). See Spanou 2018b. 
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In defining significant change, a second issue emerges: how to distinguish between 
secondary or technical and deeper changes. Sabatier and Jenkins–Smith (1999: 147) 
distinguish between “major change”, affecting the policy core aspects of a governmental 
programme, from “minor change” referring to its secondary aspects. The vast majority of 
changes occur in the secondary aspects, i.e. instrumental decisions to implement the policy 
core (administrative rules, budgetary allocations, disposition of cases, statutory 
interpretation) (ibid. 133). A major change relates to the extent to which it challenges or 
destabilises established policy preferences, as reflected in statutes, processes and practices. 
Referring to the significance of change, Hall (1993) distinguishes three orders of change. 
First order changes are routine adjustments to past and new policy developments. Second 
order changes involve new policy instruments, (e.g. systems of controlling public 
expenditure facilitating cuts, introduction of Mid-Term Fiscal Strategy -MTFS) etc. Both first 
and second order changes are part of a ‘normal policy-making’ process and preserve the 
continuities in policy patterns. They are dominated and guided by experts and officials 
within the civil service (not politicians) controlling the advice to decision makers (ibid. 281-
282). Third order change, by contrast, reflects radical changes in the overarching terms of 
policy discourse and the template of policy, equivalent to a “paradigm shift”. While first and 
second order changes do not automatically lead to third order change, the latter 
encompasses changes in the other two levels. Halligan (1997: 19) makes a similar 
distinction. First order AR simply adapts and fine-tunes accepted practices. Second order AR 
refers to the adoption of new techniques. And third order AR is concerned with sets of ideas 
which comprise the overall goals and the framework which guide action. In order to take 
into account implementation, Boyne et al. (2003:29-30) for the assessment of AR combine 
two variables: policy regime (old and new) and policy implementation (policy as adopted, 
and policy as implemented). 
A third issue in assessing significant change is the criterion used. Change is measured by 
relating the major deficiencies in the Greek context to the adequacy and relevance of the 
remedies adopted and implemented. Critical deficiencies refer to the ‘quasi-weberian’ 
aspects of the political-administrative system. They involve a low level of 
institutionalisation, legitimacy and efficiency, and the lack of continuity and institutional 
memory (Spanou 1998). The fundamental values and principles linked to the weberian 
administration are constantly at odds with the perception and use of state rules and 
resources as ‘privileges’ to be politically distributed. This wider policy frame accounts for 
perpetuating critical deficiencies, and is part of their deeper governance causes. 
In light of the above, change as significant departure from the status quo marks a shift in the 
corresponding policy frame (reform as adopted and as implemented), challenging existing 
arrangements and altering old practices. The rest of the paper discusses the significance of 
changes actually produced during the crisis years. The substantive content of ARs and the 
manner in which they are implemented offer an entry into the policy frames that provide 
the meaning and guide the choice of remedies. They further reveal how actors involved (re-) 
frame problems and solutions in order to adapt them to their ability and willingness to 
promote change. In that sense ‘solutions’ (or policy preferences) offer themselves for a 
reverse reading of the degree to which a problematic situation is actually challenged. 
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3. Reform dynamics and outcomes 
Two major reform areas are examined: public financial management (PFM) and human 
resources management (HRM), including the availability of data on public sector 
employment
3
. These two sectors had for a long time avoided constraints that could limit the 
discretionary use of state resources by political actors. Unconstrained freedom to use state 
resources constitutes the condition for ‘distributive policies’ (Lowi 1964) favouring political 
clienteles and short-term electoral objectives. 
In both areas, the most prominent deficient feature is fragmentation, another word for lack 
of binding rules and constraints and lack of transparency, suiting the centrifugal tendencies 
of the political personnel. Any -usually lukewarm- effort at tightening up the system was 
fiercely resisted or undermined. From this point of view, the notorious lack of reliable fiscal 
and HR data, which would increase transparency and therefore accountability for political 
decisions, is hardly a coincidence.  
Reform requirements potentially went straight to the heart of public governance problems. 
The immediate objective was to contain expenditure. Gradually a more ‘structural’ 
dimension emerged, i.e. establishing mechanisms for the better allocation and use of 
(financial and human) state resources. The issue at stake was to create clear and stable rules 
containing and constraining (political and administrative) actors’ behaviour in this regard. 
 
 
3.1 Fiscal management: reconfiguring the back box 
 
3.1.1 Antecedents 
 
Until recently, PFM could be regarded as the ‘black box' of government in Greece. Lack of 
central monitoring, coordination and control, coexisted with insufficient information and 
reliable data, fragmented and uncontrolled practices by various state entities. Budget 
formulation was excessively decentralised while budget execution was excessively 
centralised. From an organisational and operational point of view, the Finance Minister 
appeared -somewhat paradoxically- to be isolated, if not weak. The ministry did not have 
the ability to monitor centrally and in real time more than 60% of General Government 
expenditures and to intervene to contain expenditure. Thus, various state entities (local 
authorities, insurance funds, hospitals and public utilities) were taking on financial 
obligations (e.g. wage policy, loans, procurement etc.) which resulted in budget overruns, 
deficits and expenditure not registered in the budget. 
 
Attempts at remedies were essentially defined and confined to increasing detailed and 
centralised ex ante controls of legality. Not only did they overlap, but resulted in highly 
bureaucratic and time-consuming procedures. They also prevented the development of 
financial responsibility and accountability within ministries and agencies. Transparency and 
accountability were equally low
4
. Above all, there was no balance sheet regarding the total 
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This is based on empirical research included in Spanou 2018b. 
4
 According to a report of the European Commission (EC 2007), among 18 EMU countries, Greece ranked 
highest in terms of centralisation of budget execution, last in budget transparency, before last regarding the 
top-down budgeting process. 
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state of public finance, while the Parliament had no possibility to examine and approve the 
entire fiscal activity (Rapanos 2007: 48 ff.). 
 
Various reform opportunities proved inconclusive. During the 2000s, recommendations and 
expertise provided by international organisations, such as the OECD (2008) and the IMF 
(2006), advocated a radical change. Their proposals converged towards stronger top down 
budgeting and accountable budget execution. They included a Medium-Term Budget 
Framework for annual budgets, an integrated budget for the whole of General government 
(i.e. including local government, insurance funds and other public bodies) accompanied by 
systematic fiscal reporting, especially for Insurance funds and local government and a single 
account for the transparent management of the central government budget. They also 
recommended programme budgeting linked to policy objectives and a shift to ex post 
expenditure reviews and performance audits by the Court of Auditors, increasing the 
accountability vis-à-vis the Parliament for the efficient and effective allocation of resources. 
Last, stronger financial management capacity and accountability within the various public 
entities was urgently called for. 
 
These recommendations defined a completely different approach to the budgeting system 
problems and solutions. Instead of defining the problem in terms of centralised bureaucratic 
controls and procedures, the recommended remedies pointed to a binding framework for 
political discipline and accountability on one hand, and to enhanced administrative capacity 
for efficient decentralised budget execution in individual public entities on the other. At the 
central level these changes required the development of a policy analysis capacity within 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) (i.e. expenditure reviews, programme evaluation in terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness etc.) and moving away from micro-management and routine 
controls. The division of roles and responsibilities between central Budget services and 
spending ministries and agencies had to change radically. 
 
Fiscal management reform was undoubtedly ripe in terms of reform directions, though for a 
long time these did not find an open ear in various governments. Awareness of the problem 
was limited among domestic experts and within MoF circles
5
. It had not reached priority 
status on the governments’ agenda and had even less provoked any public debate. Its 
political (and financial) implications remained hidden behind its technical nature. 
 
With the onset of the international financial crisis in 2008, the above deficiencies could no 
longer be swept under the political carpet. The economic derailment exposed their 
consequences in the form of high levels of budget deficits and sovereign debt and a 
fundamental lack of reliable statistical data. Addressing chronic distortions in PFM was the 
most urgent priority (OECD, 2011:14 and 71 ff). The objective was to discipline fiscal 
behaviour in order to meet strict fiscal targets, as well as to systematically monitor budget 
execution and produce accurate and timely fiscal reports. 
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 Pilot projects for programme budgeting were launched in the Ministry of Culture (2008). PFM reform 
appeared in the electoral programme of Pasok in the 2007 and 2009 elections. 
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3.1.2 PFM: A radical change of perspective 
This external shock gave an immediate impulse for a radical change of PFM. Past IMF and 
OECD recommendations came to the fore as the new frame of reference. The introduction 
of a coherent fiscal management system was launched in January 2010 on domestic 
initiative, with the technical assistance from the IMF
6
. Subsequent legislative initiatives 
came about as a result of structural fiscal reforms included in all three MoUs but also by 
changes in European regulations (2011 and later)
7
. 
The whole budgeting system was remodeled in terms of formal structures, procedures, rules 
and standards. It unfolded along the lines proposed earlier by the IMF and the OECD, with 
the exception of programme budgeting, which was seen as a subsequent stage. The role of 
the MoF as the central actor in budget formulation and execution was considerably 
strengthened as was its grip on other ministries’ and entities’ expenditure. New instruments 
were developed such as the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework-MTFS (3-year rolling), which 
defines the general strategy and serves as the point of reference for annual budgets; top-
down budgeting process with binding expenditure ceilings per central administration entity 
for the entire General Government; the Expenditure Commitment Register and corrective 
mechanisms to address cases of deviation from agreed fiscal targets; and new fiscal 
reporting obligations for various public entities organised in line with the European 
timeframe and standards (the so-called ‘European Semester’). 
The strengthened central functions of the MoF essentially relies on the leading policy role of 
the General Accounting Office (GAO). This shift is complemented by the parallel 
strengthening of the financial management capacity and responsibility of ministries. The 
establishment of a network of new General Directorates of Financial Services (GDFS) in 
‘spending’ ministries under the guidance of the GAO illustrates the new division of 
responsibilities for the entire budgeting process (formulation, execution, control and 
reporting). Furthermore, a major shift from ex ante to ex post controls of expenditure 
renders the GDFS primary responsible for ex ante controls, while the Court of Accounts 
concentrates on ex post controls and the GAO gradually moves towards spending reviews. 
Fiscal transparency was equally reinforced by institutional reforms, such as the 
transformation of the statistical services to an independent authority in 2010 (the Hellenic 
Statistical Authority -ELSTAT); the creation of the Parliamentary Budget Office provides 
support for an enhanced role of the Parliament in the budgetary process. The Hellenic Fiscal 
Council as an independent authority now monitors compliance with fiscal rules. Last, but by 
no means least, in terms of procedures and standards, the public sector accounting system 
changed (or, better, is changing) to comply with European and international standards. It 
establishes a common way of representing economic data for all General Government 
entities, replacing the -until recently- five different, fragmented and non-compatible 
systems of functional data classification. 
 
                                                     
6
 Papaconstantinou, 2016:197 and MoF, 2009: 26 ff. 
7
 Major legislative stages in this process are laws 3871/2010, 4270/2013 (incorporating European Directive 
2011/85/EU (L 306/45) and 4337/2015. 
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3.1.3 Assessment 
PFM reform epitomises a belated, but radical policy shift in a highly problematic sector of 
the Greek political-administrative system. There is no doubt that the sovereign debt crisis 
served as a focusing event, an external shock exerting a forceful pressure for change. PFM 
received the necessary and long overdue attention. From closed expert circles, it was urged 
on the agenda. Obstacles and political resistance from individual ministers, which had 
opposed change in the past (Alogoskoufis 2014), became practically irrelevant. 
The establishment of the GDFS in ministries presents a particular significance, extending far 
beyond fiscal management to touch upon the politics-administration relations (below). The 
GDFS undertake a both innovative and unprecedented task, a ‘custodian’ role regarding the 
expenditure ceilings and commitments, as well as sound fiscal management. Transforming 
senior officials into a sort of counterweight to political leadership and its possible tendency 
not to adhere to a binding fiscal framework is a crucial component and challenge of this 
role. To the extent that such responsibility is accompanied by necessary guarantees and 
meets the capacity of senior civil servants, it potentially rearranges the terms of their 
relation to politics. 
The most impressive aspect, nevertheless, rests in the fact that this has been one of the few 
reforms that presents continuity. It consistently unfolded, remaining on track beyond the 
term of individual ministers and governments. The constant presence of and coaching by 
the IMF in its double quality as technical assistance provider and a tough member of the 
troika cannot be underestimated. Domestically, the impressive continuity may be also 
attributed to the political leadership of the MοF during these times. The MoF as one of the 
signatories of the MoU and aware of the stakes, was responsible not only for meeting fiscal 
targets but more generally for the compliance with, and implementation of its terms. 
PFM reform features a shift in policy frame, a modernisation of instruments and consistent 
implementation, enhancing the credibility of the system. While problems and solutions 
were insufficiently acknowledged until then, a new policy frame prevailed. The crisis 
presented the window of opportunity, providing forceful incentives and the possibility to 
overcome resistance.  
A critical question remains: how sustainable is this change? The major challenge ahead is a 
shift of mindset at the level of both political leadership and administrative officials in line 
with the new policy frame. Politicians must conform to a restrictive, controlled and coherent 
three-year fiscal management framework, responsibly set priorities within limited 
resources, and take into account the long-term impact of their short-term political 
considerations. Administrative officials need to rise to their new demanding role as General 
Directors of Financial Services. At the heart of their task lies a contradiction, i.e. they are 
taken between two potentially diverging allegiances, one functional (towards the MoF) and 
one hierarchical (Ministry of placement). They are also more exposed as a result of the 
abolishment of central ex ante controls and tend to be more hesitant. Their role needs to be 
supported and defended against small, indiscernible but critical changes (e.g. erosion of 
their status and powers through changes in the organisational charts, their mode of 
selection, the length of their term of service, etc.). 
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3.2 HR Data: leaving the terra incognita behind 
3.2.1 Antecedents 
The absence of sufficient and reliable data has been a typical characteristic of the Greek 
administrative system. Collection and processing of information had never been a priority, 
as a direct result of the fragmentary way in which decisions were usually made and the lack 
of interest in ensuring policy implementation and continuity. 
The “unusually high degree of uncertainty” (OECD, 2011: 59) affecting public employment 
data particularly beyond central government, essentially originates from two deficiencies. 
On the one hand, there are problems related to HRM, such as high diversity of employee 
status and regime, misallocation of personnel and unregulated hiring on fixed-term 
contracts that were later transformed into permanent employment positions. On the other, 
there is a hazy picture regarding the number and missions of various public sector entities, 
particularly those operating under private law. Past attempts to count and register them 
encountered major difficulties and remained incomplete. Decades-long political 
controversies over the number of public sector employees and of public entities were fed by 
this terra incognita of the Greek political-administrative system. 
 
3.2.2 ‘Learning to count’ 
As the news regarding the situation of public finance started to break, the MoF launched 
initiatives to get a clear picture of, but also contain, public expenditure. It involved among 
other, a census of public sector human resources and the establishment of the Single 
Payment Authority (EAP) for all kinds of payments
8
. When the first MoU was signed, these 
two initiatives were incorporated into the structural reform for administrative 
modernisation (EC, 2010: 47-48 and 67)
9
. 
The complex character of the endeavor cannot be overstated. Creating a Human Resources 
Register for the entire public sector required the collection and verification of information 
on total personnel per public entity, employment status, and so forth; it required the 
parallel inventory of public entities. 
The scope of the census was progressively and repeatedly broadened in order to include all 
General government entities and forms of employment relations. Given the circumstances, 
it stirred broader concerns that the public entities could be abolished and their personnel 
would be dismissed. Resistance in the wider public sector has been remarkable, judging 
from the series of legislative measures that provided for sanctions against those (entities, 
political heads and public employees) who would not comply with the obligation to register 
or to join the Single Payment Authority. Similar concerns regarding the systematic updating 
of the Register are reflected in the introduction of penal and disciplinary sanctions in case of 
non-compliance. 
                                                     
8
 G. Papaconstantinou, Finance Minister in November 2009. http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=101869 
A General Directorate of Remunerations was legislated in May 2009 (Ν.3763/2009) but had not advanced until 
then.  
9
 Laws 3845/2010 and 3870/2010. 
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Notwithstanding the difficulties and delays, this reform bore fruit. The Single Payment 
Authority is since a few years operating within the MoF/GAO and directly linked to the 
Human Resources Register. According to the budget proposal of 2018 (MoF, 2017), the 
share of entities integrated into the Single Payment Authority exceeded 98%, while another 
1.5% of them were in the process of complying. The Ministry of Administrative 
Reconstruction regularly updates Register of Services and Agencies and informing ELSTAT 
accordingly (Register of General Government Entities). And a network of HR officers have to 
constantly update the data base regarding exits, transfers and new recruits, while further 
qualitative aspects of the employees’ profile are to be introduced (digital files’). 
 
3.2.3 Assessment 
This reform laid the foundations for the rationalisation and better utilisation of HR. The 
Register would allow not only a quantitative but also a qualitative overview and monitoring 
of public employment. It has further the potential to facilitate HR and wage policy planning, 
as well as to ensure transparency and accountability in this policy area. 
With its technological infrastructure constantly upgraded, the Register supports further 
applications. Not only can it provide accurate data for information-based policy but also 
evolve into an integrated system for the management of human resources. Though this is 
still a long-term perspective, a ‘Digital Organigramme’ is already built upon the census 
database, reflecting in real-time the structure of the General government and the allocation 
of human resources, positions and corresponding requirements. 
This infrastructure has already been used for the implementation of the new mobility 
system and the electronic performance assessment process (at least partly). The reform is 
still evolving, since various entities still need to upload organigrams, job descriptions and 
qualitative data. Its completion remains among the post-memoranda obligations.  
The HR Register is developing into broader HR policy instrument with multiple potential 
uses. It provides an infrastructure capable of supporting a potentially significant policy shift. 
Its very existence allows a different approach to HRM and public sector organisation: the 
need and possibility to know, monitor and use data for policy decisions. It also allows to 
control and contain previous unregulated, fragmented and ultimately non-transparent 
practices. Its association to the SPA reestablishes the necessary connection between 
budgetary and HR policies leading to a more comprehensive policy. For these reasons, it 
corresponds to a new policy frame: a state that ‘knows itself’. 
The new policy frame needs however to impregnate political mentalities and behaviour. The 
degree to which the data remain accurate and publicly accessible (transparency) constitutes 
a critical side aspect. Lack of knowledge was also a political asset and an opportunity 
allowing wider discretion that was systematically exploited in the past. 
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3.3 HRM: Reform over-reach and blind spots 
3.3.1. Antecedents 
Addressing human resources in the Greek administration cannot be understood outside of 
the long-standing tradition of state-employer and political patronage. The ‘labour intensive’ 
character of PA, the fragmentation of employee regimes and the variation of remunerations 
despite efforts at a single pay system, the misallocation of personnel, as well as the lack of 
reliable data on HR illustrate its consequences. The same goes for the imbalance between 
the administration and politics and the resulting low independence and professionalism of 
the civil service (Spanou 2008, 2001; Sotiropoulos 2007).  
HRM issues were seen as ‘distribution of privileges’ (allowances, career prospects etc.) 
rather than as supporting an efficient and reliable state apparatus. This formed the basis of 
a public service bargain (Hood and Lodge 2006) and a “symbiotic relation” (Spanou 2001 
and 2014b) between politics and administration countering or preventing the modernisation 
of administrative organisation, operation and, ultimately, performance (Spanou 2012). 
Dissatisfaction with low administrative capacity was constantly invoked by a profusion of 
reform initiatives during the past decades. Certain aspects of HRM have been particularly 
targeted (e.g. selection for manager positions, recruitment system etc.), while others 
remained off the political agenda (e.g. mobility, evaluation). Such a selective “reform over-
activity” (Spanou 2010), was accompanied by highly symbolic references to civil service 
values, such as merit and impartiality, that served to simply repackage long-standing 
practices. Formalism became a dominant character of the civil service rules, which –perhaps 
paradoxically- coexisted with the by-passing of rules and procedures that further 
undermined the credibility of reform intentions and interventions. These features reflected 
an overt or concealed party competition for the appropriation of the public personnel. 
In the crisis context, the administrative capacity in general and HRM in particular became a 
major area of reform (Featherstone 2014). Improving the administrative efficiency and 
effectiveness were directly linked to reorganisations, simplifications, reallocation of 
personnel, and all components of HRM. The overarching priority to reduce public 
expenditure and employment however did not do justice to critical reform challenges. Only 
under the 3rd MoU the reform agenda was relieved from narrow fiscal considerations. 
The OECD (2011) review stressed the urgency of qualitative aspects of HRM reforms setting 
the essence of the agenda. Its well noted recommendations took time to reach the MoU 
and the government agenda. Downsizing overshadowed HR policies (Spanou 2014a and 
2015). The following analysis focuses on two major HR reform areas: (1) internal HR 
management processes and (2) politics-administration relations. 
 
3.3.2 Internal management processes 
3.3.2.1 Mobility 
The lack of mobility has been a distinct characteristic of the Greek public sector employment 
system over the past decades. The establishment of an inter-ministerial career path 
(especially) for top managers has repeatedly been recommended by experts throughout the 
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postwar era. Obstacles to mobility stem from a series of factors some of which are also to 
blame for the broader qualitative and/or quantitative misallocation of personnel. 
The lack of a broader framework providing for the comprehensive management and the 
coverage of needs in HR left to the employees’ individual choices whether to move or to 
stay for their entire professional lifetime in the same service. Their mode of recruitment and 
employment status tied them to a specific ministry or entity, while a complex and 
fragmented system of job classifications (‘branches’) created barriers to horizontal mobility. 
Most of transfers or secondments (including their prolongation ad infinitum) were sought 
on individual initiatives, followed personal networks and were often shielded from 
transparency. By not integrating mobility unless requested by public servants themselves, 
the Greek administration had essentially given away a significant instrument for flexible HR 
management. 
The issue was particularly highlighted in the OECD review. It proposed the enhancement of 
mobility by: a) opening up mobility between the central administration and the other 
sectors of the General government (regional services, legal entities), b) creating a single 
system of classification of employment positions in the entire General government, 
drastically reducing its ‘branches’ and streamlining positions by job descriptions, c) 
publicising job openings/vacancies and the holding open competitions for every post, and d) 
introducing appropriate incentives and training programmes. 
Mobility was nevertheless not treated as an HRM instrument per se, but rather as a means 
of curtailing public employment, absorbing high levels of energy and political capital. 
Parallel changes such as restructuring of ministries (2014 and 2017/2018) and job 
descriptions progressed slowly. Only under the 3
rd
 MoU a permanent system of mobility 
reached the government agenda, as a means for the optimal allocation of human resources. 
The new mobility system (law 4440/2016) covers the entire General Government and 
rationalises certain critical dimensions such as: (a) the overturning of the relationship 
between secondments (exceptional and temporary) and (permanent) transfers, as the 
normal procedure to meet fixed needs; (b) a centrally managed process (Central Mobility 
Committee, Ministry of Administrative Reconstruction), based on uniform rules and 
procedures and regular publicizing (3 times a year) of available openings in order to attract 
demand; (c) job descriptions and required qualifications provide criteria to match supply 
and demand. 
Assessment  
Mobility as a policy issue was systematically sidelined in the past. Though overdue, it is 
finally set on new foundations and reflects a significant departure from the previous 
practice. It introduces transparency and predictability both for the state entities and the 
public employees. This in principle discourages individual search for ways to bypass or speed 
up the process and reinforces the independent administrative operation. Mobility is 
modernised as a policy tool, including rules, procedures, and technological infrastructure 
(‘Digital Organigramme’). 
However, it is entrapped in a pre-existing frame that leaves it incomplete and vulnerable. 
Mobility remains a purely voluntary initiative of the employee. It is seen as a ‘privilege’ 
(officially a ‘right’) and not as an integral part of a career trajectory, neither are 
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administrative needs a priority. Thus, modernisation, coexists with the perpetuation of a 
core element of the preexisting policy frame, undermining its importance and limiting its 
impact.  
Together with the never completed streamlining of the job classification system 
(‘branches’), which is a structural prerequisite for enhancing mobility, this shows that the 
old approach of the issue has essentially survived. Ad hoc circumventions of the obstacle 
that branches represent for mobility can be observed (e.g. regarding access to top 
managerial positions). Furthermore, ‘exceptional’ arrangements tend to reproduce old 
practices that the new mobility system sought to eliminate. While long-term secondments 
need to be abolished, the deadline for permanent transfers has already been extended 
three times, while there are several examples of new secondments. Above all, certain 
services are starting to be ad hoc exempted from the mobility system, i.e. secondments and 
transfers take place outside the central procedures. Such practices confirm that mobility is 
still seen as a form of ‘privilege’ that is distributed through exceptional or discretionary 
political decisions. 
 
3.3.2.2 Performance appraisal 
Personnel evaluation has been repeatedly highlighted as of limited value. The plethora of 
top-level scores neutralises its significance as a tool for career development and more 
generally for managing human resources (motivation, promotion etc.). The fact that 
performance appraisals may not be carried out is meaningful in this respect. 
However, this item has long been off the government agenda. In spite of widespread 
awareness regarding its limits -or because of that- the personnel appraisal system has 
shown remarkable longevity. Unlike other aspects of HRM, it has survived since the early 
1990s (Presidential Decree 318/1992). The OECD review highlighted the absence of 
necessary conditions for performance management, but the issue reached the MoU agenda 
originally in a biased way, i.e. associated with downsizing. 
In this context, a comparative assessment method that was proposed in 2014 to contain 
top-level ratings, not only was too radical a shift but was also perceived as an immediate 
threat. While the general framework remained the same, maximum rates for the top (25%) 
and bottom (15%) rating scores (law 4250/2014) were set. This was to be used once, as a 
transitional system before the introduction of a new one. It proved however impossible to 
implement in the face of intense opposition from public employees and their unions. The 
insecurity resulting from parallel measures to reduce public employment fueled resistance 
against it. The bill for the new appraisal system prepared at the end of 2014 was never 
passed in Parliament because of the change of government. 
A new appraisal system was eventually introduced (law 4369/2016) as part of the 
requirements of the 3
rd
 MoU. It represents little more than a combination of old and new 
regulations. It reinstates the basic elements of Presidential Decree 318/1992. The 
employees are evaluated in their own right, ratings tend to concentrate above average and 
the methods to avoid the plethora of top-level ratings are known from prior experience to 
be ineffective. The new law introduces nevertheless certain innovative elements (e.g. 
plenary sessions of individual departments for the collective assessment and individual self-
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assessment of each employee in relation to their targets, anonymous assessment of 
managers by their subordinates, a mechanism to monitor and statistically analyse 
evaluation scores). 
Surprisingly, this system also encountered strong reactions from the Civil Servants’ Union 
(ADEDY) and difficulties in its implementation, though it is clearly ‘employee-friendly’. This 
time, the argument was different: it questioned the legitimacy of managers-evaluators 
who—in most cases—had not been selected in line with normal procedures but were 
exceptionally discretionary temporary assignments. Resistance was finally bypassed in 2018, 
thanks to a new electronic application hosted by the ‘Digital Organigram’ and used for a 
large part of the administration (in.gr 31.10.2018; Kathimerini 3.3.2019). 
Assessment  
During the period 2010-2018 there have been various attempts at introducing a new 
appraisal system which were abandoned by successive ministers and governments. The lack 
of continuity along with downsizing policies delayed the substance of the reform and biased 
its rationale. The drastic attempt at comparative assessment in 2014 triggered party 
controversies allowing employees who feared dismissals to resist it, in a sort of ‘civil 
disobedience’ -all the more that this was supported by the main opposition party, Syriza, 
which clearly appeared on its way to government. 
The final reform output presents only marginal changes compared to the old system. 
Delayed reform wasted energy and ultimately limited change. Preexisting frames and 
instruments of limited value remain in place while the procedure is modernised only in 
technical terms. 
 
3.3.3 Reshaping the politics – administration nexus 
Imbalance in politics-administration relationships is a perennial issue in Greek public 
administration. More than the usual intention of ensuring (party) political loyalty, this 
relationship includes clientelistic and corporatist dimensions. 
The OECD (2011) review recommended addressing the problematic politics-administration 
relationships and the major issue of ensuring institutional continuity in public 
administration. The senior civil service had to be strengthened while the influence of 
political appointees (the General and Special Secretaries as well as political advisors) had to 
be curtailed, through the reduction of their number and specification of their tasks. 
However, this change was reduced to changing the status and mode of selection and 
appointment to respective positions. 
 
3.3.3.1 Selection of managers 
The selection of managers has constantly been suspected of political partiality, while 
neglecting merit considerations. To dissipate such suspicions, successive reform initiatives 
announced ‘de-politicisation’. They sought their legitimacy in formalism and standardisation 
repackaging them as merit, transparency, and impartiality. Party competition led to 
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repetitive changes in the career rules: the grade and career system were reformed seven (!) 
times in less than 20 years (1999–2016). The successive changes were secondary (e.g. years 
of service, previous service in management positions, etc.) but actually affected the (size of 
the) pool of candidates. The heart of the matter, i.e. the respective roles and responsibilities 
of political appointees and senior civil servants hardly received any attention. Neither did 
the effects of the instability of rules (Wettenhall, 2013). However, this instability reinforces 
the dependence of public employees to politics, since the rules are always open to (short-
term) change expectations. 
The new system of selection of managers (Law 4369/2016) essentially adopts a combination 
of previous systems (Laws 3528/2007 and 3839/2010). A rather complicated point system is 
introduced consisting of four sets of diverse, variably weighted criteria: (a) formal 
qualifications and vocational training; (b) work experience and responsibilities; (c) 
evaluation, and (d) structured interview
10
. Based on the total number of points achieved a 
short list of 7 candidates are taken for the interview in order to decide the final rating. The 
criterion (c) evaluation is suspended to the extent that it is to be based on a future 
management-by-objectives system which is still not in place (despite existing legislation). 
Last, without any comment or justification, this law re-establishes the three-year term of 
service, after its short-lived extension to five years (by law 3839/2010). 
Assessment 
Career rules under the MoU continued to exhibit a high degree of instability: four 
consecutive laws between 2010 and 2016 brought minimal added value while most of them 
were either not implemented at all or only with regard to their transitional provisions. As a 
result throughout the crisis period, the administration remained in transitional status, i.e. 
operating on the basis of temporary assignments in management positions. 
Reforms remain since decades captured in the same policy frame which prevents the 
development of an independent and professional civil service. Successive laws, are little 
more than variation on the same theme while their instability undermines trust in rules and 
institutions. 
The one element that is constantly overlooked and therefore remains stable is the term of 
office. Since the 1980s, the idea of a ‘mobile’ hierarchy has prevailed, on the basis of a 
three-year term, followed by the return of the civil servant to his/her previous (lower) 
position. This practice has significant disadvantages, including the weakening of 
administrative hierarchy and the stirring of individual ambitions. Fluidity of rules, formalistic 
criteria
11
 and the three-year ‘rotation’ constitute major problems for the civil service system 
that politicians as well as public servants have not sought to address (‘areas of immunity’), 
since they define the terms of their “symbiosis”. 
A substantial reshaping of the politics-administration relationship would need a re-definition 
of the ‘problem’ and the ‘solution’, and a move away from the constant manipulation of 
                                                     
10
 To give an example, for General Directors these account respectively for 30%, 20%, 20% and 30% of the total 
number of points. However, within each set all sub-criteria are assimilated (e.g. managerial experience and 
general work experience) thus losing their significance. 
11
 Like in past systems, there is an emphasis on formal qualifications (e.g. university degrees, postgraduate, 
doctoral degrees and training) not as a pre-condition for access to senior positions, but as symbol for merit. 
  
14 
formal career rules. A new framing involves a redefinition of roles and responsibilities 
between political appointees and senior civil servants and substantive (non-formalistic) 
criteria of selection. Upgrading the role of senior public servants and creating for them the 
conditions to live up to this role have not been achieved. This is why only the experiment of 
the General Directors of Financial Services (GDFS) potentially meets the requirements for a 
major reform. 
3.3.3.2 Depoliticisation of executive positions 
Depoliticisation of executive positions in specific sectors was initially raised in relation to the 
services whose credibility and efficiency were seen as affected by political interventions. 
Major examples are the National Statistical Service, which became (law 3832/2010) an 
independent authority –ELSTAT; the General Secretariat of Taxation and Customs that 
became in 2012/2013 the General Secretariat of Public Revenue (4093/2012) and was 
succeeded in 2016/2017 by the Independent Authority for Public Revenue (4389/2016), etc. 
Though there appeared no prior indication in this direction, the 3rd MoU expanded this 
‘depoliticisation’ requirement into the entire ‘executive staff’, i.e. the politically appointed 
and freely revocable General and Special Secretaries in ministries and the Heads of public 
entities. Distance from politics was perceived essentially in terms of status and selection 
process. 
The changes introduced by Law 4369/2016 (and its amendments) establish a four-year term 
of office (instead of revocability) for executive positions and delimit government discretion 
through a process of qualifications assessment. This is attempted by means of two basic 
mechanisms. Firstly, the National Register of Executive Staff, which is electronically 
compiled by the Supreme Council for Civil Personnel Selection (ASEP) and serves as a pool of 
candidates (mainly from the public but also from the private sector). Secondly, the process 
of public announcement of vacancies, followed by candidates’ assessment by the ‘Special 
Board for the Selection of Executive Staff’ that shortlists three candidates. Ministerial 
discretion comes at the last stage: he/she has the choice among the shortlisted candidates. 
Assessment 
Such a change can be considered as a radical shift of approach. It attempts to potentially 
rationalise and standardise the selection of these officials, subjecting the originally full 
political discretion to institutional constraints and filters. However, the specifics of this 
reform point to a different perspective. Unlike its French archetype, the Register is little 
more than a formal requirement, since it creates a large pool of candidates of uneven 
profile (qualifications, experience and career stage) without prior evaluation. The selection 
process needs to narrow a large number of candidates down to a short-list of three. The first 
critical filter is therefore the public announcement which specifies the requirements; and 
the second is the short-listing process, for which there is no defined procedure, with the 
exception of the Selection Board. 
This reform stands out for compromising its depoliticisation objective from its inception. In 
its first application, unjustified variations were observed regarding the requirements defined 
in 22 public announcements for administrative secretaries (around 1/3 of the total 
positions). The government did not content itself with the institutionally provided political 
discretion at the short-list stage, but tried to promote its favourite candidates. The 
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European institutions requested to restart the process, after setting minimum requirements 
for public announcements.  
Under the surface of a strictly regulated process, a lot of margin was left informally to 
influence the selection outcome beyond what is institutionally allowed. Furthermore, its 
implementation was delayed, leaving the political appointees in place as long as possible 
and is still not concluded less than six months ahead of the forthcoming (2019) general 
elections. Ironically, ‘depoliticisation’ became a matter of party controversies, leading the 
main opposition party to announce that it would abolish this system. Visibly, the new policy 
frame was immediately confronted with, and captured by pre-existing patterns of political 
behaviour. 
Inherent in this reform is also a perverse equation between depoliticisation and institutional 
memory on one hand and the four-year term on the other. However, the four-year term 
could simply contribute to the unobstructed performance of the duties. But in no case does 
it guarantee institutional continuity and memory since it is not a career position. 
A more general issue needs to be raised. Whereas government discretion in selecting 
executive staff is acceptable in numerous administrative systems, the MoU did not retain 
this option. Thus, the attention was diverted from the real stake of civil service 
empowerment. Instead of revising the role and responsibilities of political appointees, 
‘depoliticisation’ was devised in terms of status and selection which are known to be easily 
influenced. This is confirmed by the earlier experience of the resignation of the first (2014) 
and the dismissal of the second (2015) General Secretary of Public Revenue who –on the 
insistence of the troika— were selected through a special competition process and were 
provided with a ‘guaranteed’ five-year term. 
Thus, instead of actually reshaping politics-administration relationships, as initially 
recommended by the OECD, the focus on status and selection ignored the essence. In the 
absence of an operational definition and division of tasks, the strengthening of the senior 
civil service vis-à-vis politics is not simply waived but further constrained by the ambivalence 
of the (political or administrative) role of the new ‘depoliticised’ Administrative and Sectoral 
Secretaries.  
 
4. Comparing reforms 
The AR agenda was ambitious and extensive, evolving with every update of the MoU. 
However, the required reforms often differed in various aspects. Some were more closely 
defined than others. Certain issues reached the agenda practically for the first time (i.e 
budgeting reform, mobility, performance appraisal, depoliticisation of executives) while 
others had a long history of previous repeatedly inconclusive or symbolic reforms (selection 
of managers); still some other aspects never really made it to the agenda (three-year term 
of office, mobility as part of the career development etc.). Last, they differed with regard to 
those groups affected by the changes. 
Based on the above overview of the reforms, two general observations can be made. First, 
the outcome is uneven in terms of its ‘significant departure’ from the status quo. This 
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mainly refers to their content. Second, despite the generally restrictive framework of close 
monitoring by the international and European lenders, the continuity and consistency of 
reforms are equally uneven. In certain cases they are impressive for Greek standards while 
in others the well-known pattern of discontinuity prevails, following the frequent changes of 
governments and even more so ministers in the course of the past decade. 
More specifically, reforms related to fiscal management and HR data developed rather 
consistently under the three MoUs. Furthermore their content clearly demarcates them 
from past patterns of operation. HRM reforms in contrast seem intermittent and erratic, 
constantly experimenting different solutions and delaying the production of results. The 
gradual formation of the agenda and the difficulties stemming from parallel downsizing 
policies may explain these features, but only in part. Even more important, the changes 
eventually introduced tend to either reproduce the status quo or indirectly neutralise any 
substantial innovative element. If a paradigmatic shift in AR initially appeared ambiguous 
(Featherstone, 2014: 16; Ladi 2014; Lampropoulou & Oikonomou 2018), at the completion 
of the 3
rd
 adjustment programme the significance of the changes visibly varies according to 
the reform area. 
 
4.1 Prevalence or capture? 
During this period, old policy frames and patterns found themselves competing with new 
ones. The most consistent and radically new frame characterises PFM. It managed to 
prevail, the old one proving unsustainable under the crisis circumstances. The role assigned 
to the GDFS also corresponds to a radically different policy frame pertaining to the 
substance of the politics-administration relations. It needs to be noted however, that such a 
critical re-shaping of these relations has not been generalised in other areas of the civil 
service. It remains isolated and potentially vulnerable.  
Collecting HR data touched upon sensitive issues of the existing policy frame. Their 
importance for achieving fiscal targets contributed to the passing from the terra incognita to 
reliable and monitored data on (public sector) personnel and the overall wage bill. 
By contrast, with regard to HRM reforms, old policy frames remained active permeating or 
even capturing at various degrees the new ones. Fiscal pressure was indirect; it mainly took 
the form of downsizing measures that rendered the environment of HRM reforms more 
difficult and affected the capacity of corresponding ministers to promote them. Beyond this, 
it hardly influenced the content of reforms. Significant room was left for domestic influence 
on policy preferences. The representatives of the lenders delegated the specification of 
solutions to outside experts increasingly involved in the provision of technical assistance. 
This advisory assistance did not have a directive (i.e. executive) role
12
. 
                                                     
12
 First, it was within the TF-GR, created in September 2011 by the EU Commission, where France was 
designated as the “domain leader” or “reform partner” in administrative reform; later, from 2015 onwards, by 
the French TA agency “Expertise France”. 
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The wider margin of discretion that was left to domestic actors in the area of HRM reforms 
is a first factor accounting for the differences observed when compared with those in PFM. 
It is reflected in the continuation of party competition and symbolic policies (Spanou 1996), 
with constant doing and undoing, delaying reforms outputs, not to say outcomes, and 
wasting large amounts of time and energy. It is also reflected in the perpetuation of the old 
policy frame, where public resources are perceived as ‘privileges’ to be distributed, through 
the change of rules. What seems to have been underestimated by the troika (and the TA) is 
that the Greek political system ‘thrives’ on changing civil service rules. It readily took the 
opportunity offered by MoUs to play the new (reform) game with the old rules and thereby 
reproduce the “public service bargain”, as noted above. 
One case stands out for not complying with this pattern: the 2014 introduction of the 
comparative assessment. Such a radical policy shift –which was momentarily possible 
because of the domestic discretion— is a clear illustration of the incompatibility and 
ultimately the clash between the old and the new policy frames. It is also a confirmation a 
contrario of the prevalence of the old public service bargain in all areas of HRM. Not only 
frame incompatibility turned to clash, but contrary to other cases, this took place in the 
open, despite the politically restrictive framework of the time. Such a development was 
favoured by imminent elections (in January 2015) and the expected change of government. 
 
4.2 Secondary changes and the ‘invisible game’ 
Though all reforms examined had a central character, they affected their ‘recipients’ in 
different ways. In some cases they introduced unprecedented constraints, rearranged 
processes and responsibilities and tightened supervision, without however affecting public 
employees in their status and career prospects. PFM and data collection (including the 
single payment authority) faced potential opposition primarily from political officials 
defending their margin of freedom. However these were limited in their resistance capacity 
vis-à-vis the MoF. 
HRM policies concerned public employees and even required their cooperation (e.g. 
performance appraisal, mobility etc.), not to mention the need for their cooperation in 
sectoral reform areas. Reforms affected directly their status, remuneration, career 
prospects etc. In parallel, the pressure for drastic downsizing exacerbated struggles among 
various groups of public employees fighting for limited resources. 
The above-highlighted availability of domestic discretion combined with the need to 
compensate public employees or secure in some way their cooperation provided 
opportunities for the survival of the old policy frame. As explained above, this regarded 
public resources (in this case, status, remuneration, career prospects etc.) as ‘privileges’ to 
be distributed, and, more importantly, such a margin continued to exist. Thus the old 
perception prevailed in HRM, passing its core elements on to the reforms. The mostly 
secondary changes introduced correspond to the influence of (senior) administrative 
officials over new policy choices as well as to the political officials playing by old rules. In this 
context, the symbiotic relationship between politics and administration essentially 
reproduced the terms of the existing public service bargain. 
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In such conditions, an invisible game was played among those groups of public servants who 
had better access to the shaping of policy choices. They did not act as a single actor. On the 
contrary, various policy choices bear the mark of differential treatment of specific sub-
groups; middle and lower level employees were more affected than senior civil servants in 
terms of remuneration and more vulnerable to downsizing. In terms of remuneration, senior 
public servants are comparatively better off than before; some even improved their future 
career prospects, based on the perpetuation of formalistic selection criteria or through the 
exceptional lifting of obstacles to compete for senior positions (e.g. exception from the rule 
of ‘branch’). By contrast, the restructuring of the ‘branches’ proved to be the most 
complicated reform endeavour. This is not a coincidence. It potentially affected the whole 
public service, involving too many competing corporatist interests. It was therefore 
consistently delayed if not blocked. This invisible game may also account for the policy 
discontinuities in HRM: the change of ministers revived expectations and offered 
opportunities to various groups of public servants for influencing the content of related 
policies. 
These various forms of preservation of rationales entrenched in the old policy frame 
account for high reform ambitions essentially resulting in secondary changes, such as the 
modernisation of instruments (rules, procedures, technological infrastructure, etc.). 
Business as usual, led to simply ‘fine-tuning’ of existing practices, not significantly departing 
from previous practice and away from a frame shift. Instrument modernisation can well 
coexist with a (re-)distribution of advantages (e.g. career prospects) leaving intact the 
hardcore of pre-existing policies. Such examples are given above in the analysis of the 
strictly marginal changes in personnel appraisal, in the selection of managers, but also in the 
employee-centered mobility and the preservation of ‘branches’. Where elements of a new 
policy frame potentially appeared, through domestic discretion the policy design left wide 
open possibilities to be exploited by older rationales at the implementation stage (executive 
staff, exceptions from mobility). 
 
4.3 The consensus on instruments 
Given the pressure for reform and the complexities surrounding it, modernisation of 
instruments seems to be the easiest part. It provides a basis for consensus that veils or 
sidelines divergent policy approaches in terms of causes and remedies. When ambitious 
reform goals are translated into useful instruments, all parties in the reform process tend to 
focus on secondary changes. Such a focus suits those domestic political actors who are not 
prepared (politically or intellectually) for deeper changes. Conveniently, instruments 
represent tangible effects; they can be easily observed and checked as ‘deliverables’ during 
the monitoring process. Besides, the level of instruments is the privileged terrain of 
technical assistance, which may have a limited understanding of deeper deficiencies, of 
related stakes and past experiences, but also a limited influence on available policy choices. 
In administrative reform the causal chain is long and the outcome difficult to measure in 
quantitative terms (compared to fiscal indicators and macro-economic performance). Thus, 
the resulting focus on means easily leads to a sort of goal displacement. Isolated from the 
initial ambitious objectives, the focus on instruments may shield deeper practices and 
rationales from being challenged. For instance, new techniques and infrastructure that were 
meant to change the terms of the politics-administration nexus and preclude the use of HR 
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issues from being used as ‘distribution of privileges’, were isolated from this major policy 
objective and lost their ambition. The focus on instruments allows to claim that there is 
change independently of its significance. Above all, instruments that are not integrated into 
a wider policy framework which relies on, and puts them in use are fragile and can be easily 
isolated and neutralised. 
This is not to say that more sophisticated tools are not important. But they do not 
necessarily lead to change to the extent that the policy frame remains unchallenged. The 
new instruments risk falling into inertia and being silently abandoned when there will be no 
pressure from outside monitoring. 
 
5. Conclusion: change and sustainability 
In this paper we tried to assess the outcome of administrative reforms during the crisis in 
Greece by comparing two main areas: public financial management and HR management. 
Change was assessed in terms of significant departure from the status quo, i.e. challenging 
deeper policy frames and patterns accounting for critical deficiencies. The core element of 
the pre-existing policy frame is a long-standing perception of state resources (either 
financial or other) as privileges to be politically distributed. 
The new reform agenda induced by the OECD and inscribed in the three MoUs entailed new 
policy frames that had to compete with existing ones. This competition took place on 
different terms depending on the reform area. The comparison reveals uneven change. In 
fiscal management, where new policy frames prevailed, there is significant change, affecting 
the policy core. In HRM results are rather unambitious, mostly repackaging old practices. 
Old policy frames survived, capturing the new ones to the extent that they contained 
innovative elements. Thus the changes introduced are mostly secondary and did not 
challenge the core of pre-existing policy arrangements. Policy problems were constructed in 
a way that emphasised their preconditions in terms of instruments, rather than in terms of 
deeper changes. 
The conditions under which the reforms were devised and implemented were equally 
different. The pressure from the MoU was direct in the case of PFM and to a large extent HR 
data. But it left a limited margin of maneuver for domestic discretion. The MoF was aware 
of the stakes of such reforms, less dependent on other actors, and disposed of effective 
means of pressure. On the contrary, the fiscal priority had a powerful influence on HRM but 
limited in its quantitative aspects. Downsizing represented a shock that stimulated 
resistance within the administration. The narrow fiscal focus left a wider margin to domestic 
discretion. In this context, the old policy frames managed to preserve the ‘public service 
bargain’ that defined the terms of the symbiosis between politics and administration. 
Secondary changes prevailed, additionally enhanced by the unavoidable focus of the 
monitoring methods and of technical assistance on instruments rather than on policy core 
issues. 
An inevitable last question is about reform sustainability. Sustainability seems to be a 
common challenge, regardless of the significance of the reforms achieved to date. There are 
various factors accounting for this. The Greek context of low institutionalisation allows (if it 
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does not encourage) constant piecemeal changes in the name of reform, marking a striking 
lack of awareness of the consequences of constant instability (Wettenhall 2013: 160). The 
long-standing gap between formal rules and informal practices is also a source of concern. 
Where old policy frames have survived, the sustainability of even secondary reforms is 
fragile and uncertain. But where new approaches to policy have prevailed, they may as well 
be tested under different conditions and could be defied. It sounds cliché to say that 
political commitment to sustain and further develop reforms is critical. For instance, it is 
important that the newly available instruments are put in use in order to rationalise policy; 
that accurate data are collected and used; that the HR Registry is systematically and 
accurately updated, or that the mechanism for the central management of mobility is not 
sidelined by the proliferation of exceptions; that the digital organigramme continues to be 
developed and serves as a basis for HR policy, and that the GDFS are supported in their 
redefined role etc. Inconsistent implementation (e.g. through the introduction of 
exceptions) is the first sign of the resilience of old policy frames. 
Is there hope that secondary changes can influence core policy preferences? Beyond a 
reminder of Hall’s observation that first and second order change does not automatically 
lead to a paradigm shift, it is important to retain that the MoU reforms changed what they 
could change ‘from outside’. Deeper changes need to come from the inside, following an 
endogenous process in Greece. 
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